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I 
will say at the outset of this review that I am no theorist. I Andrew Sharpe, 
on the other hand is a theorist, and a keenly insightful one at that. In his opus, 
Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law, Sharpe takes on the 
monumental task of integrating, synthesising, and deconstructing trans gender 
JD (Chicago). For the last 6 years, Jennifer Levi has done civil rights work on behalf 
of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender clients at a non-profit legal organisation in 
Boston Massachusetts. Her current position is as an Assistant Professor at Western 
New England College School of Law. 
The author has served as a senior staff attorney at the non-profit legal organization 
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD). GLAD's mission is to bring 
impact-oriented cases in order to bring about the end of discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, gender identity and HIV status. In addition to being counsel to 
plaintiffs in Rosa v Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 214 (1st Cir. 2000) 
and Beger v Acting Com'r, Div. of Medical Assistance, 2000 WL 576335 (Mass. 
Super. 2000), Jennifer Levi currently represents seven same-sex couples granted the 
right to marry under state law in Massachusetts. Goodridge et at v Department of 
Public Health et ai, No. SJC-8860 (Mass). 
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jurisprudence2 as it has evolved in common law traditions. The result is quite 
fascinating, successfully breaking the case law down into several predictive models 
which serve as useful tools for practitioner and theorist alike. Sharpe goes even 
further in his efforts by identifying the homophobia that underlies so many of the 
unprincipled decisions in cases involving transgender people, particularly in the 
marriage and family law area. From the perspective of an attorney who litigates 
cases on behalf of transgender people as well as same-sex couples seeking marriage 
rights, I think Sharpe has done an incredible job identifying the source of the 
internal inconsistencies in such cases. 
Sharpe's work arrives on the scene at an exciting moment in the legal and cultural 
history of transgender. While it is true that the transgender rights movement has a 
rich, complex, and varied past,3 the last ten years have brought an intense maturity 
to the movement including, at least in the United States, significant political gains 
at the state and locallevels.4 Along with this maturation and these gains has come a 
question of the locus of our movement and, more broadly, the nature of its 
relationship with an arguably more established, coordinated, and theorised gay and 
lesbian movement. Sharpe's contribution to this cultural moment is invaluable for 
at least two reasons. One, by being the first in-depth and full-length comprehensive 
treatment of the topic of transgender jurisprudence, it will be, and indeed is already 
emerging as the foundational work by which others will be measured. And, two, by 
exposing the homophobia underlying many of the key decisions, particularly in the 
area of marriage and family law, it provides an important link between the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgcnder movements which may not and should not be 
ignored by activists from both worlds. 
4 
By the term transgender jurisprudence, Sharpe means to include all cases involving 
transgender litigants to the extent that the litigants' transgender status is relevant to 
the case. In Sharpe's view, transgender identity includes people who identify as 
transsexual. It also includes people who do not 'conceive of themselves as being of 
the sex opposite to that designated at birth' and people who have a range of cross-
gender characteristics but do not necessarily 'complete crossings of that divide'. See 
A Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law (2002) 45. 
For a more detailed description of the transgender rights movement in the United 
States, including, in particular, its relationship with the gay and lesbian rights 
movement, see S Minter, Symposium, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? 
Getting Real about Transgender Inclusion in the Gay Rights Movement, 17 New York 
Law School Journal of Human Rights 589 (2000). 
Incredible work has been done in the United States, particularly at the state and local 
level, to explicitly include transgender people in non-discrimination laws and 
ordinances. As of April 2003, 3 states and 55 local jurisdictions have trans-inclusive 
laws including large metropolitan areas such as Boston, New York, and San 
Francisco, as well as smaller cities and towns such as DeKalb, IL, Ypsilanti, MI and 
Multnomah Co., OR. For a comprehensive and up-to-date list, see www. 
transgenderlaw.org. 
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The book is broken down into three parts. In Part I, 'Approaching Transgender 
Bodies', Sharpe provides a comprehensive medical history of transgender in order 
to set the stage for the analysis ofthe non-marriage cases that follow, cases that take 
on the legal question of male/female status. The scientific background is necessary 
both because of the medical underpinnings in almost all of the cases involving 
transgender litigants considered by courts and because of the meta-structure that 
Sharpe provides to describe the case law. In Part II, 'Homophobia as Subtext', 
Sharpe exposes the homophobia that serves as the subtext in cases involving 
marriages of trans gender people. In closely analyzing the cases in which the 
marriages of trans gender people are recognized and those in which they are 
invalidated, he highlights the motivating factor that underlies decisions that 
acknowledge a person's transitioned-to sex. Judges are willing to recognize a 
person's transitioned-to sex where doing so maintains the anti-gay status quo. 
Finally, in Part III, 'Sex: From Designation to Discrimination', Sharpe analyses 
cases involving discrimination against transgender litigants in which the court need 
not answer the question of what someone's sex is but rather whether transgender 
people fit into non-discrimination law. In this part, Sharpe gives the reader a 
glimpse of his view of the approach to transgender jurisprudence that offers the 
greatest potential for true progress, or 'reform', rather than the supposed reform 
jurisprudence that Sharpe criticises and deconstructs. 
Perhaps Sharpe's most valuable contribution to transgender law is setting forth 
models by which virtually all transgender cases involving legal determinations of 
sex can be classified. The three models he describes are (1) (bio )logical; (2) 
psychological and anatomical harmony; and (3) psychological, social and cultural 
harmony. 
The reason this 'contribution is so valuable for litigators is because it allows us to 
consider the wisdom of appealing to one or another of the available models. For 
example, Sharpe carefully and cogently describes the wisdom (or lack thereof) of 
appealing to (bio )logic as a litigation strategy. (Bio )logic" according to Sharpe 
views law as limited in its ability to determine 'true' sex. As a result of law's 
limitation, (bio)logic ostensibly defers to medicine as the arbiter of 'true' sex. In 
the foundational case of Corbett v Corbett/ the English Court held that sex is fixed 
at birth, is unchangeable, and may be resolved by 'objective' factors determinable 
at birth, such as chromosomes, gonads, and genitals. 
As Sharpe explains, the approach restricts legal claims because of courts' reliance 
on (bio )logical factors which do not account for the strong cultural, societal, and 
psychologically constructed components of gender - not to mention the 
subjectivity of medicine, to begin with - and, as a result, lacks integrity and truth 
[1970] 2 All ER 33 
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about our lives. In addition, as he explains, the model's overemphasis on one 
temporal moment belies the legitimacy of trans gender identity because of a focus 
on 'truth' of sex. The result is a 'naturalised' view of sex that calls into question the 
veracity of transgender identity. 
Turning to cases in which courts have acknowledged individuals' transgender 
reality, which Sharpe calls reform jurisprudence, the book describes two 
alternatives to (bio)logic: a psychological and anatomical harmony approach and a 
psychological, social and cultural harmony approach. Under the psychological and 
anatomical harmony approach, courts look beyond the temporal moment of birth to 
determine one's sex. Where a transgender person, through the process of sex 
reassignment, has taken sufficient steps to bring one's anatomy into harmony with 
psychological sex, courts have been willing to acknowledge the transitioned-to sex 
for some purposes. Despite the judiciary's willingness under this analysis to 'say 
"yes" to the sex claims of transgender persons',6 Sharpe nevertheless cautions 
against this approach because of its 'reproduction of gender polarity', 7 a result 
which is inconsistent with many transgender (and non-transgender, for that matter) 
people's lived experience. 
The second reform approach, that of psychological, social and cultural harmony, 
looks beyond anatomy and surgical requirements. In two social security decisions 
overturned on appeal, judges looked at the respondent's 'psychological and 
social/cultural gender identity ... not sex chromosomal configurations or gonadal or 
genital factors'. 8 While conceding that an approach that rejects a surgical 
requirement is 'perhaps to be welcomed', 9 Sharpe criticises it nonetheless for 
several reasons. First, he argues that it 'serves to reproduce the gender dichotomy 
through the articulation of a 'wrong body' story'. 10 In other words, even these more 
progressive tribunals insist that the litigant accept the "'wrongness" of the pre-
operative transgender body', and confess the truth of not having undergone surgical 
'correction'. Once the litigant has done so, Sharpe suggests the tribunal 'develop[s] 
amnesia with regard ,to [the litigants] continued possession of a "wrong", and 
therefore transgressive, body and grant[s] legal absolution'. II In addition, Sharpe 
criticizes the approach because it denies 'transgender autonomy'. 12 In other words, 
it does not allow a trans gender litigant to declare his or her own sex but, rather, 
6 
9 
10 
II 
12 
Sharpe, above n 2, 57. 
Secretary, Department of Social Security v HH [1991] 13 AAR 314, 324 quoted by 
Sharpe, above n 2, 76. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid 75. 
Ibid 77. 
Ibid. 
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retains reliance on the policing by the medical community in order to determine sex 
through detached' observation, assessment and calibration'. 13 
Herein lies perhaps the book's greatest weakness not because it omits any of the 
criticisms that may be properly waged against these models but because, in so 
soundly exposing the tensions that arise as a result of the application of each model, 
Sharpe leaves litigators like me in a quandary. How is it that we can both represent 
the interests of a particular client thereby meeting ethical obligations of zealous 
advocacy, while, at the same time, keep in mind the interests of the broad 
community that identifies as trans gender? While it may be true that a segment of 
the transgender community seeks to break down rigid gender boundaries, it is also 
true that other segments of the community wish to embrace gender albeit in a way 
that is markedly distinct from the (bio)logic hegemony that dictates one's sex at 
birth. While this divergence within the community presents fascinating questions 
of how best to advance our mutual concerns, politically or socia-culturally, without 
denigrating either experience, litigators like me are still left with real people and 
real cases in which clients serve to lose real rights, protections, or benefits, if 
advocates cannot convince a court to respect a person's sex for legal purposes. 
Although I agree that sex should be irrelevant for legal purposes - especially 
because as Sharpe so successfully points out, its relevance is usually to ensure the 
denial of protections for gay people or to enforce heterosexuality - a gendered 
binary remains not just a strong force in law but the presumed legal 'reality and 
truth' and, more importantly, the legal constraint within which litigators practice, 
particularly in the family law realm. While I strongly agree that there would be a 
benefit in breaking down this rigid binary, particularly because of the length it 
would go in advancing rights not just for transgender people but for gay and lesbian 
people, as well, many instances of litigation do not offer an opportunity to advance 
this admirable sociopolitical and cultural goal. 
On the other hand, some cases do and I would extol activists and litigators to take 
advantage of the opportunity when presented in cases where, for examp Ie, the court 
must address the question of the nature of the discrimination at issue, rather than 
whether an individual is male or female. Recent reform in the United States 
reversing unprincipled exclusions of transgender people from sex discrimination 
law offers the possibility of covering all transgender people within its protection 
because it turns on what Sharpe refers to as 'transgender performance' rather than 
ontological inquiry. 14 As I have explained elsewhere,15 cases involving 
discrimination against transgender people in employment or credit transactions, for 
13 
14 
15 
Ibid. 
Ibid 12. 
J L Levi, 'Paving The Road: A Charles Hamilton Houston Approach To Securing 
Trans Rights', 7 William & Mary Journa/ of Women & the Law 5 (2000). 
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example, offer the possibility of reversing historic exclusions while simultaneously 
educating the courts about our lives. Notwithstanding, many legal challenges 
simply do not offer this possibility and litigation should not necessarily be avoided 
simply because of law's fundamentally conservative nature. 
Moreover, in suggesting that there is a stark divide between segments of the 
transgender community that claim the 'wrong body' story and those of us who 
reject it, Sharpe misses the transgressive effects of litigating transgender issues 
from a broad range of strategies. After all, under both reform approaches Sharpe 
describes, courts have acknowledged the changeability of sex, at least for legal 
purposes. And, in the end, if one can 'change' sex, how rigid can gender 
boundaries be? 
If there is one flaw in the work - and it is hard to imagine how any foundational 
work could not have at least one - it is his failure to step into the fray and offer his 
perspective on an 'ideal' model for pursuing litigation on behalf of transgender 
clients. While this may be a philistine criticism from a post-modem perspective 
(and one leveled against probably every post-modem critic at one point or another), 
it remains significant given how far the work goes to analyse critically the efforts 
made on behalf of transgender litigants. Moreover, the reason this flaw even 
surfaces is because, given Sharpe's depth of analysis, it is hard to imagine that he 
has not been able to work through some of the more nettlesome issues that arise in 
the cases given the exhaustive review of the decisions at all levels of appeal. In the 
end, though, the work satisfies far more than it does not and, as the first in-depth 
scholarly review of the subject, sets a high bar for later works to follow. 
